We model owners as solving a multidimensional problem when taking their firms public. Owners can affect the level of underpricing through their marketing choices, such as which underwriter to hire or what exchange to list on. The benefits of reducing underpricing in this way depend on the owners' participation in the offering and the magnitude of the dilution they suffer on retained shares. We argue that the extent to which owners trade-off underpricing and costly marketing is determined by the minimization of their wealth losses. Evidence from a sample of U.S. IPOs in 1991-95 confirms our empirical predictions and suggests that failure to account for owners' incentives to control underpricing through marketing can lead to biased conclusions in cross-sectional comparisons of underpricing returns.
Introduction
Why are some initial public o erings more underpriced than others? For instance, why do IPOs by companies with dot.com in their names su er average underpricing that is nearly eight times the U.S. average of 13? Why are Chinese IPOs underpriced by 42, whereas Malaysian IPOs are underpriced by 6? And why has average underpricing in Germany quadrupled since the introduction of the Neuer Markt in March 1997?
The theoretical literature on IPO underpricing suggests a number of possible answers: some IPOs are more underpriced than others because there is greater asymmetry of information, more valuation uncertainty, greater risk of lawsuits, and so on. While we do not deny that any or all these factors may be at work, we suggest a more fundamental, non-mutually-exclusive reason: some IPOs are more underpriced than others because their owners have less reason to care about pricing accuracy. We argue that the extent to which owners will care about pricing accuracy depends on how much they sell at the IPO.
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Owners who sell very few shares will su er only marginally from underpricing. Conversely, the more shares they sell, the greater is their incentive to secure a more accurate price. As a consequence, we expect that the degree of equilibrium underpricing depends on the extent of insider selling. To return to our examples, the owners of a typical U.S. IPO sell nearly ve times more equity than the average dot.com IPO; Malaysian owners sell 58 times more equity in IPOs than do their Chinese counterparts; and the companies going public on Germany's Neuer places.
Controlling for the owners' incentives to secure a more accurate price in turn helps us understand the choices they make when going public. To illustrate, in the U.S. and Canada issuers can choose between a best-e orts o ering which i s c heap in terms of cash expenses but typically leads to high underpricing and a rm-commitment book-building which is expensive in terms of fees but leads to lower underpricing. Similarly, a German high-tech company can choose to go public domestically, or obtain a listing on NASDAQ which will cost more but may result in more accurate pricing, if U.S. banks and investors are better able to value high-tech companies. Issuers can choose to hire a top-ight i n vestment bank, at a higher fee, and bene t from the quality certi cation such a bank may provide, or they can hire the cheapest bank available. 3 They can similarly choose di erent auditors or lawyers based on reputation and certi cation considerations and di erent levels of voluntary disclosure based on competitive considerations. 4 These examples highlight that issuers can, to some extent, make costly choices which lead to lower expected underpricing. In other words, there may be trade-o s between what we label the marketing costs of going public and underpricing. Combining this view with our claim that issuers care about underpricing primarily to the extent that they participate in the o ering, we predict that issuers will rationally decide to spend more when going public, the more they plan to sell at the IPO. Thus, rm-commitment o erings should, on average, be most attractive for larger issues; a NASDAQ listing will appeal to German high-tech entrepreneurs who plan to cash out; hiring a top-ight investment bank or auditor will be worthwhile for larger issues; and greater voluntary disclosure will be desirable if the bene t from more accurate pricing outweighs the competitive disadvantage.
In this paper, we formalize, develop, and test the ideas that underlie the preceding discussion.
There are two main premises to our analysis. The rst is that owners care about underpricing to the extent that they stand to lose from it, and that any such losses are proportional to the number of primary new and secondary old shares being sold. The second is that issuers can a ect the level of underpricing through the costly marketing choices they make. We assume that issuers choose between di erent marketing strategies as illustrated in our previous examples. It is clearly impracticable to attempt to capture all the various possible combinations of marketing choices, such as underwriter, auditor and lawyer reputation, target investment audience, extent of roadshows, multiple listings possibly in di erent countries, and so on. Instead, we measure the total cost of each issuer's chosen marketing strategy and compare this cost across issuers.
Total marketing costs include the fees paid to underwriters, auditors and lawyers, advertising expenses, listing fees, etc but exclude management time, which cannot easily be measured. 5 For marketing costs to a ect underpricing presumes that marketing an issue can bean alternative to underpricing the issue. This was recognized more than a decade ago by Allen and Faulhaber 1989 , Booth and Smith 1986 , Carter and Manaster 1990 , and Welch 1989 Whilst their focus was on signaling issue quality through underpricing, Allen and Faulhaber 1989, p. 305 and Welch 1989, pp. 438-439 noted in passing that signaling could also be accomplished through the choice of underwriter and auditor, and through advertising, respectively.
Carter and Manaster 1990 derived and tested an inverse relation between underpricing and underwriter reputation, 6 which combined Beatty and Ritter's 1986 inverse relation between underpricing and issue quality with Titman and Trueman's 1986 positive relation between issue quality and underwriter reputation. Finally, Booth and Smith 1986, p. 267 speci cally discussed the trade-o between the cost of certifying an issue's quality and underpricing:` t he more costly is external certi cation relative to the bene t, the more likely the stock or risky debt to be issued at a discount. The underwriter will incur direct costs of certi cation only to the point where marginal cost of certi cation equals marginal bene t so that net issue proceeds are maximized ... .' Generalizing Booth and Smith's point, we can view marketing and underpricing as substitutes. Issuers are then faced with a multidimensional problem when taking a rm public.
In addition to the level of underpricing, issuers must choose an optimal marketing strategy, which involves deciding which underwriter and auditor to choose and how much to spend on advertising, as well as all the other marketing activities which may help reduce underpricing. 7 We examine the optimal mix of these activities, and show h o w the choice between underpricing and marketing varies with the number of primary and secondary shares that are sold at the o ering.
We use a simple model based on Benveniste and Wilhelm's 1990 adaptation of the Rock 6 This inverse relation has recently been questioned by Beatty and Welch 1996 , who found a positive relation between underpricing and underwriter reputation in the 1990s. We return to this issue in Section 4.3.
7 Of course, the choice of underwriter is not entirely at the discretion of the issuer, for the underwriter may refuse to take part in the o ering. But the fact remains that the issuer has some choice in choosing an underwriter. For evidence of such c hoice, see Dunbar 1999 and footnote 3. 4 1986 model to analyze the problem. 8 Our purpose in using a formal model is twofold. First, we use the model to verify our main intuition, speci cally that issuers will incur greater marketing costs when selling more shares. An issuer selling more shares clearly stands to lose more than an issuer selling fewer shares for a given level of underpricing. The former therefore has a greater incentive to incur the marketing costs that we argue decrease underpricing. In the Rock 1986 model, underpricing is necessary to induce uninformed investors to take part in the o ering despite the adverse selection problem introduced by the presence of informed investors.
Marketing serves to increase the fraction of uninformed investors taking part in the o ering Carter and Manaster, 1990 . Marketing therefore decreases the extent of the adverse selection problem, thereby decreasing the necessary amount of underpricing. Second, we use the model to derive a n umber of testable implications and optimality restrictions. Some testable implications are very intuitive. For example, as noted above, marketing costs should increase in the numberof shares sold. Incurring these marketing costs is worthwhile only if they decrease underpricing. Underpricing should therefore decrease in marketing costs. Other testable implications are less intuitive. Consider how underpricing varies with the numberof shares sold. Our earlier discussion suggests that the incentive to reduce underpricing should begreater for issuers selling more shares. Therefore, the optimal combination of underpricing and marketing should involve higher marketing costs and lower underpricing for large issues than for small issues. This intuition implies that underpricing should decrease in the numberof shares sold. However, there are possibly o setting e ects, depending on the 8 We note that our use of the Rock 1986 adverse selection rationale for underpricing is without loss of generality. All that is needed for our argument to hold is i a reason for underpricing and ii one or more alternatives to underpricing. 9 We formalize this argument in Section 2.
5 origin of the shares sold. Where the IPO consists of primary shares, the marketing costs are borne by the company in the rst instance, thereby reducing both the after-market share price and the o er price by the same amount. But because most IPOs are underpriced, the o er price is reduced by more in percentage terms than is the after-market share price, resulting in greater underpricing. This second e ect works in the opposite direction to the rst e ect whose intuition we described earlier.
Where the IPO consists of secondary shares, there is no second e ect because the costs are borne by the selling shareholders. Mixed o erings are more complicated. Tracing these e ects cannot easily be achieved in the absence of a formal model.
The optimization problem faced by the issuer imposes testable restrictions on the regression equations we derive. The issuer minimizes her wealth losses from going public. These equal the sum of the marketing costs she incurs and the losses from underpricing and dilution, and should beminimized through the choice of marketing costs.
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An increase in marketing costs has two e ects on wealth losses: i a direct e ect, which increases wealth losses as marketing costs are part of wealth losses; ii an indirect e ect, which decreases wealth losses by decreasing underpricing. Optimality requires these two opposing e ects to be equal at the margin. It therefore restricts the coe cient of a regression of wealth losses on marketing costs to be zero.
Our data supports the predictions of our model. Using a large sample of U.S. IPOs from 1991 to 1995, we nd that underpricing decreases in marketing costs, and marketing costs increase in the numberof shares sold. Furthermore, underpricing decreases in insider selling, as suggested by our earlier discussion of dot.com IPOs. We also nd that issuers in our sample are optimizing: at the margin, each dollar of marketing spending reduces wealth losses by 98 cents, indicating that the marginal cost of marketing equals the marginal bene t of reduced wealth losses. Finally, we show that a particular dimension of issuers' marketing strategy, the choice of underwriter, is related to how many shares are sold. between`good'and`bad' issues, and so su er from the winner's curse: they are likely to be allocated a disproportionate share of`bad' issues, to which informed investors do not subscribe.
To induce uninformed investors to take part in the o ering, it is therefore necessary to sell the issue at a price below that warranted by its intrinsic quality. As the winner's curse increases in proportion to the fraction of informed investors with whom goodissues are shared, so does the necessary amount of underpricing.
The fractions of informed and uninformed investors are exogenously xed in Rock 1986, but in our model they can beendogenously determined by the issuer. Speci cally, we assume that the issuer can increase the fraction of uninformed investors participating in the o ering by incurring greater marketing costs. For example, the issuer can, at a cost, hire a more reputable underwriter, whose greater reputational capital will encourage more uninformed investors to take part in the o ering.
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Underpricing decreases as a result.
While undoubtedly bene cial to the issuer, the decrease in underpricing requires the issuer to incur higher marketing costs. These may o set the bene t of lower underpricing. How the issuer chooses between underpricing and marketing costs naturally depends on how a given combination of marketing costs and the associated underpricing a ects her wealth losses from going public. This in turn depends on the issuer's participation in, and the dilution resulting from, the o ering. who constitute a fraction U = 1 , I of the total population of investors.
As discussed in Section 2.1, the fractions I and U depend on the marketing costs incurred by the entrepreneur. Speci cally, U U exp, where exp denotes the marketing cost per original share. We assume 0 U exp 0 and 00 U exp 0: higher marketing costs induce more uninformed investors to take part in the o ering, but do so at a decreasing rate.
As is the case in practice, we assume that a fraction of total marketing costs E X P N o exp is paid by the rm and the remainder 1 , directly by the entrepreneur.
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= Nn Nn+No;s = 12 Throughout, we will use lower-case letters to denote variables normalized by the number of original shares N o , and capitals to denote untransformed variables. 9 nn nn+no;s , as the fraction of the costs paid by the rm is proportional to the rm's fraction of the proceeds from the IPO. No is the normalized numberof primary shares. We refer to n o;s as the issuer's participation ratio and to n n as the dilution factor. We use normalized variables because the absolute number of shares is arbitrary: there is evidence that issuers split their shares before an IPO to generate o er prices within certain ranges. 14 The N o;s secondary shares and the N n primary shares are sold at a price P 0 . Following the IPO, the value of a share of the rm is P 1;G = NoP G +NnP 0 , Noexp No+Nn or P 1;B = NoP B +NnP 0 , Noexp No+Nn with equal probability. Post-IPO, a share therefore has price: P 1 = 1 1 + n n P + n n 1 + n n P 0 , exp 1 + n n and variance 2 1 = 1 1+nn 2 2 . The price P 0 at which shares are sold to investors must besuch that uninformed investors expect to break even on average, for they otherwise would not subscribe to the IPO. P 0 is therefore such that: 1 2 U P 1;G , P 0 + 1 2 P 1;B , P 0 = 0 P 0 = U P G + P B 1 + U , exp P 13 Of course, the entrepreneur, as the rm's original owner, ultimately bears the entirety of the marketing costs E X P. But the distinction between the fraction of marketing costs that is paid directly by the entrepreneur and that paid indirectly through the entrepreneur's ownership of the rm has important implications for our comparative statics results. See Proposition 2.
14 The median o er price in the U.S. has been virtually unchanged at around $11 since the 1970s even though median gross proceeds have more than trebled, from $8m in the 1970s to $28m in the early 1990s.
where the ultimate equality is true by substituting the values of P 1;G and P 1;B and the inequality is true by noting that U 1. As noted by Rock 1986, shares must be sold at a discount to their expected pre-IPO value in order to compensate uninformed investors for the adverse selection introduced by the presence of informed investors.
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Shares are also sold at a discount to their expected post-IPO value, P 1 . This can beseen by substituting the expression for P 0 into that for P 1 to obtain:
In common with the IPO literature, underpricing is de ned as U P P 1 ,P 0 P 0 . The normalized wealth loss su ered by the issuer due to such underpricing, the resulting dilution in her stake because P 1 P as P 0 P , and her share of the marketing costs is: Note that the issuer bears the entirety of the marketing cost exp.
Results and discussion
The purpose of our analysis is to examine the variation in the underpricing return U P and the wealth loss wlas a function of the participation ratio n o;s , the dilution factor n n , the uncertainty parameter , and the marketing cost exp. The issuer minimizes her wealth losses from going public. She therefore solves the optimization problem:
which has rst-order condition:
The issuer's choice of exp clearly depends on n o;s , n n , and . Indeed, we have:
Proposition 2.1. The marketing cost of the IPO, exp, increases in the participation ratio n o;s , the dilution factor n n , and the uncertainty parameter .
Proof: Immediate from equation 2.3.
The results for the participation ratio and the dilution factor con rm our informal discussion in the introduction and in Section 2.1: an issuer who sells a greater fraction of her rm or issues more new shares has a greater incentive to control her wealth losses from underpricing. She does so by increasing marketing costs. She also increases marketing costs in response to greater uncertainty because, as we show in Proposition 2, underpricing and hence wealth losses increase in uncertainty.
We can now establish our main result:
Proposition 2.2. The wealth loss wl increases in the participation ratio n o;s , the dilution factor n n , and the uncertainty parameter . It is invariant to the marketing cost exp in equilibrium. The underpricing return U Pdecreases in the marketing cost exp and in the participation ratio n o;s . Its variation in the dilution factor n n is indeterminate. It increases in the uncertainty parameter when controlling for the marketing cost exp, but its variation in is otherwise indeterminate.
Proof: see Appendix.
The results for the variation of the wealth loss in the participation ratio, the dilution factor, and the uncertainty parameter are similar to and share the same intuition as those for the marketing cost in Proposition 1. The invariance of the wealth loss to the marketing cost in equilibrium is nothing but the re ection of the zero rst-order condition at the optimum: recall that the rst premise of our analysis implies that the issuer chooses marketing costs to minimize her wealth loss from going public.
The decrease of underpricing in the marketing cost con rms the second premise: the issuer can a ect underpricing through her choice of marketing cost. The decrease of underpricing in the participation ratio combines this inverse relation between underpricing and marketing costs with the proportional relation between the marketing cost of the IPO and the participation ratio established in Proposition 1.
That underpricing does not necessarily decrease in the dilution factor, despite the similarity between the dilution factor and the participation ratio, is a consequence of the o setting e ect of the dilution factor on underpricing through the fraction of the marketing cost that is paid by the issuer. As can be seen from inequality 2.1, both the issue price and the post-IPO price decrease in , by the same amount exp. This identical absolute e ect translates into a greater relative e ect on the issue price, which is smaller than the post-IPO price. This 13 increases underpricing.
The proportional relation between underpricing and uncertainty is a well-known result. As in Rock 1986, uncertainty increases the extent of the adverse selection problem faced by uninformed investors. They consequently require a greater discount to be induced to take part in the o ering. However, this argument assumes marketing costs are xed. It does not recognize the issuer's incentive to increase these costs for the purpose of countering the increase in the discount granted uninformed investors. Extending the argument to incorporate the issuer's incentive to increase marketing costs reveals two distinct e ects of uncertainty on underpricing.
A direct e ect, which increases underpricing, and an indirect e ect through marketing costs.
The variation of underpricing in the combination of these two e ects is indeterminate, for the direct e ect increases underpricing whereas the indirect e ect decreases it.
Comparative statics and cross-equation restrictions
The comparative statics implications of Propositions 1 and 2 can be obtained by linearizing exp = exp n o;s ; n n ; , U P = U P n o;s ; n n ; ; exp and wl= wln o;s ; n n ; ; exp to obtain: exp = 0 + + 1 n o;s + + 2 n n + + 3 + " Regression UP2 is obtained from regression UP1 by substituting regression exp1 for exp. Regressions UP1 and UP2 di er in that the slope coe cients of the former constitute partial derivatives whereas those of the latter are total derivatives, which incorporate both the direct e ect of the participation ratio, the dilution factor, and uncertainty on underpricing and The intuition is clear. The indirect e ect unambiguously decreases underpricing. The slope coe cients that combine both e ects should therefore bealgebraically smaller than the slope coe cients that include the direct e ect alone.
Econometrically, regressions exp1 and UP1, and regressions exp1 and wl1, form two systems of simultaneous equations, linked in each case by the endogeneity o f exp. The standard response to such simultaneity is to use either two-stage least squares or three-stage least squares to obtain consistent and e cient parameter estimates. However, our two simultaneous equations models are a special case, in that they each form a fully-recursive triangular system Greene, 1997, p. 736f . As long as the errors are uncorrelated across equations, triangular systems can beconsistently estimated using equation-by-equation ordinary least squares Hausman, 1978. Whether the errors are indeed uncorrelated across equations is of course testable.
Our model does not endogenize the decision how many shares to oat. This is not to claim that issuers do not choose the o er size, though we are implicitly claiming that the determinants of o er size are uncorrelated with our variables of interest. If true, it will allow us to look at choice of marketing and wealth loss minimization conditional on the issuer's choice of o er size.
If not true, our empirical model will be misspeci ed and our coe cient estimates biased. There are good reasons to suppose that o er size may be correlated with our variables of interest. For instance, issuers might use o er size alongside underpricing to signal inside information, as in the signaling models of Allen and Faulhaber 1989 , Grinblatt and Hwang 1989 , and Welch 1989 . Alternatively, issuers might adjust o er size in the light of information gathered during book-building. Ultimately, this is not a theoretical but an empirical question which we will return to in Section 4.2. The nal sample consists of 1,376 companies.
Most cross-sectional data is taken from SDC's database. First-day trading prices come from the CRSP tapes. Information on over-allotment option exercise was gathered from Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, news sources and subsequent 10-Qs and 10-Ks, since we nd SDC's exercise information to be reported with error. SDC does not classify shares sold under an over-allotment option as primary or secondary, so where exercised, we assume over-alloted shares were primary unless the issue was purely secondary to start with. Information about company age at otation comes from Standard & Poor's Register. To measure underwriter quality, we use the`tombstone' underwriter reputation rank variable developed by Carter and Manaster 1990 , as updated for the 1990s by Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998. 16 In a previous draft, we also used Ritter's 1991 sample covering IPOs from 1975-1984. Both samples yield similar results.
17 Dilution factors ranged from a 575-fold to a 4,025-fold increase in shares outstanding. Ratios that high are invariably due to very low reported pre-otation N o , and could conceivably be due to data errors. We tried unsuccessfully to verify this by means of a Nexis news search. The exclusion is clearly ad hoc, but we note that it in fact weakens our empirical results.
Variable de nitions and model speci cations
The three dependent v ariables in our model are the underpricing return, estimated from the IPO price to the rst-day closing price; wl= wealth losses perold share, as calculated in equation 2.2; and exp = normalized marketing costs, taken from the Securities Data Company's New Issue database. exp includes auditing, legal, roadshow, exchange, printing, and other expenses of the o ering as well as accountable and non-accountable underwriter expenses, but not the underwriter spread, which w e view as a payment for underwriting risk and thus not as a choice variable.
The speci cation of most of our regressors, such as the participation ratio and the dilution factor, is determined by our theoretical model. To control for ex ante uncertainty , we use two alternative t ypes of proxies. The rst type is rm characteristics, speci cally company age at otation, the natural log of sales as a measure of rm size, and leverage = debt debt+equity . Prior studies suggest that younger and smaller companies are riskier and thus more underpriced Ritter, 1984; Ritter, 1991; Megginson and Weiss, 1991 , whilst the presence of credit relationships reduces uncertainty and required underpricing James and Wier, 1990. 18 The second type of proxy is derived from the put option nature of the underwriting contract. 
to estimate ex ante uncertainty than an investor who merely observes company age, size, and the existence of credit relationships. We thus expect spreads to beincrementally informative about valuation uncertainty.
Information about gross spreads is readily available in SDC's database. However, instead of the gross spread we use only one of its components, the so called underwriting fee. There are two reasons for this. First, the gross spread compensates the investment bank for more than its underwriting services. A narrower proxy, the underwriting fee charged for the underwriting cover, should hence be more informative about valuation uncertainty. Second, Chen and Ritter 1999 document a tendency for gross spreads to beexactly 7 for over 90 of medium-sized IPOs in the mid to late 1990s. Whilst this tendency is less pronounced in our earlier sample period, it still a ects 60 of sample rms. Underwriting fees, on the other hand, are much less prone to clustering. 19 We also control for the partial-adjustment phenomenon rst documented by Hanley 1993, consistent with Benveniste and Spindt's 1989 prediction that expected underpricing, in a world of asymmetric information, is minimized when discounts are concentrated in states where investors provide strong indications of interest during the bank's marketing e ort. Following Hanley, w e control for investor interest by including a variable partadj which equals the percentage adjustment b e t ween the midpoint of the indicative price range and the o er price. Finally, we control for the possibility of`hot' or`cold' IPO markets Ritter, 1984; Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter, 1994 by including time dummies.
19 Speci cally, in our sample they are four times more variable than gross spreads. Underpricing averages 13.8 in our sample, in line with previous studies. 9.5 of sample rms close strictly below the o er price and 16.4 close exactly at the o er price. The remaining 20 182 of our sample rms use underwriters which are not ranked in Carter and Manaster 1990 or Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998. We inspect the banks they use, only one of which J.P. Morgan strikes us as obviouslỳ prestigious'. We arbitrarily assign it a rank of eight. The remaining banks are assigned a rank of zero. Our results are robust to di erent treatments. 20 74.1 are underpriced.
Wealth losses for the median issuer in Panel C are $2.4m, which include marketing costs of $650,000. Average wealth losses are higher, at $6.5m, due to the presence of some highly underpriced o erings. On a per-share basis, the average median wealth loss is 107 c 54 c, 17 c 13 c of which represents marketing expenses. The remainder is due to the e ects of selling underpriced shares and su ering dilution on retained shares. Table 2 presents the equation-by-equation least-squares results for the four regressions exp1, UP1, UP2, and wl1, adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's 1980 heteroskedasticityconsistent covariance matrix. The rst column estimates the determinants of marketing costs exp. The exp regression exhibits considerable explanatory power with an adjusted R 2 of 58.
Empirical results

Regression results
The coe cients estimated for n o;s and n n are statistically signi cant at the 0.1 level and con rm our prediction that issuers spend more on marketing, the greater their participation ratio and dilution factor. We also include gross proceeds to control for economies of scale in marketing costs see Ritter, 1987 , and nd signi cant support for the expected negative relationship between gross proceeds and marketing costs pershare. Underwriting fees correlate positively with marketing costs, consistent with the hypothesis that greater valuation uncertainty increases fees, though the coe cient is signi cant only at the 7 level. The other risk proxies, age, log sales, and leverage, perform less well.
The second column reports the coe cients estimated for regression UP1. By the standards of the IPO literature, the regression has very high explanatory power, with an adjusted R 2 of 33. The estimated coe cients strongly support our predictions: underpricing is lower the larger the participation ratio n o;s p = 4:5 and the more issuers spend on marketing p 0:01. These ndings are robust to controlling for Hanley's 1993`partial adjustment e ect' whose existence we con rm in our data set: underpricing is signi cantly greater, the more the o er price exceeds the midpoint of the ling range. The ndings are also robust to controlling for valuation uncertainty using either set of proxies: younger and smaller issuers and issuers with higher put option premia underwriting fee are signi cantly more underpriced, and the presence and extent of prior credit relationships leverage signi cantly reduce underpricing as in James and Wier 1990. Regression UP2 in the third column drops exp from the underpricing equation, forcing the e ect of marketing on underpricing into the coe cients for n o;s , n n and valuation uncertainty.
Adjusted R 2 drops slightly, to 32.8, and the remaining coe cients appear negatively biased compared to regression UP1. Our cross-equation restrictions R1 predict that the size of the bias is exactly , 4 i , using the notation of Section 2.4. Wald tests on the coe cients reported for regressions UP1 and UP2 in Table 2 fail to reject these restrictions at any level of signi cance. Proposition 2 predicts that underpricing decreases in n o;s which the negative and statistically signi cant coe cient con rms but leaves the remaining e ects unsigned.
Still, the coe cients estimated for the remaining e ects are intuitive: higher dilution n n leads to lower underpricing p = 1 :2 while greater valuation uncertainty leads to higher underpricing p = 4 :8 or better, depending on the proxy.
The nal column of Table 2 investigates the determinants of wealth losses. As predicted in Proposition 2, wealth losses signi cantly increase in n o;s p 0:2 and n n p = 5:7 as well as valuation uncertainty, all of which con rms the comparative statics of our model comfortably so in view of the high adjusted R 2 of 31.4. Furthermore, issuers seem to be choosing their marketing spending optimally: the coe cient of 0.023 estimated for exp is virtually zero, as predicted in Proposition 2. Note that the dependent variable here is total wealth losses, including marketing costs. If we regress wealth losses excluding marketing costs on the same set of variables, we nd that every dollar of marketing spending reduces wealth losses by 98 cents, which clearly indicates that the marginal cost of marketing equals the marginal bene t, the reduction in wealth losses regression results not reported.
As argued previously, OLS estimates will be consistent and e cient as long as the errors of the exp regression are uncorrelated with the errors of the underpricing and wealth loss regressions, respectively. Are they? Using the regression residuals, we cannot reject that the errors are indeed uncorrelated across equations, at any signi cance level, so the equation-byequation least-squares results presented in Table 2 should bebothconsistent and e cient.
In summary, the signs and signi cance levels of the coe cients we estimate as well as the test of the cross-equation restrictions support each of our predictions, including the optimality condition. 
Exogeneity and feedback
Our empirical modeling has treated the number of shares sold as exogenous with respect to underpricing, ruling out a signaling role for underpricing or a feedback e ect of underpricing on the choice of number of shares sold. To see whether the number of shares sold is indeed exogenous, we perform two tests. The rst speci cally addresses the possibility of feedback.
Assume that during the course of book-building, the issuer learns that underpricing is likely to be high, perhaps because the expected winner's curse is high. A rational response for an issuer which does not face capital constraints is to reduce the size of the o ering. Our empirical nding that smaller o erings are more underpriced could thus be due to feedback and learning during book-building, rather than marketing and incentives. To see if this is the case, we re-estimate our four regressions exp1, UP1, UP2 and wl1 with the intended rather than actual numberof shares sold.
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Our results remain unchanged: issuers spend more on marketing, the more shares they intend to sell, underpricing decreases in marketing costs and the intended numberof shares to besold, whilst expected wealth losses are invariant to marketing costs at the margin.
The second test is a Hausman 1978 speci cation test see Greene, p. 763 . Assume that the number of shares sold is chosen simultaneously with underpricing as in IPO signaling models or that expected underpricing a ects the number of shares sold as in the feedback argument. In that case, the least-squares estimates of the e ect of the numberof shares sold on underpricing reported in Table 2 will bebiased and inconsistent, while two-or three-stage least squares estimates will beconsistent. If, on the other hand, the numberof shares sold is exogenous with respect to underpricing as our model assumes, all three estimation techniques will be consistent but only OLS will be e cient since OLS is the best linear unbiased estimator, or BLUE. Hausman's test statistic measures the bias in the vector of coe cients under these alternative estimation techniques. In our case, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the bias 22 SDC's New Issues database reports the intended number of shares as led with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Unfortunatey, it does not distinguish between primary and secondary shares, so we use N o;s + N n intended , normalized by N o .
24 is zero at the 10 level or better. This indicates that allowing the number of shares sold to be a ected by underpricing does not signi cantly alter the least-squares coe cient estimates in Table 2 .
Choice of underwriters
One of the marketing choices issuers can make is to hire prestigious underwriters who according to Titman and Trueman's 1986 model and Carter and Manaster's 1990 empirical evidence use their reputation capital to`secure a better price'. In the context of our model, we would expect i issuers' choice of underwriter prestige to depend on n o;s and n n assuming that ii underpricing is indeed negatively related to underwriter reputation, such that iii issuers optimize at the margin, their wealth losses being invariant to changes in choice of underwriter. To test these predictions, we use the Carter-Manaster`tombstone' reputation variable, rank.
The results are in Table 3 . The rst two columns replicate the underpricing and wealth loss regressions, UP1 and wl1, from Table 2 , including rank. The OLS coe cients estimated for rank are positive and signi cant at p 1 which leads to the surprising conclusion that more prestigious underwriters are associated with higher underpricing and wealth losses. To illustrate, the estimated coe cient suggests that every unit increase in underwriter reputation rank say from 5 to 6 increases underpricing by half a percentage point say from 12.7 to 13.2. In dollars, this would raise wealth losses by 5 c a share, or $365,000 in total. The positive e ect of bank reputation on underpricing is clearly at odds with evidence from the 1970s and 1980s, but mirrors the results of Beatty and Welch 1996 and several recent papers which use 1990s data. However, the coe cient estimates tell only half the story. The regressions ignore that the choice of underwriter may be endogenous according to our model: it should bethe issuers with the most to gain from lower underpricing who choose the most prestigious underwriters. Ignoring this may bias the OLS coe cients.
The third column reports the results of estimating a probit regression of underwriter choice on n o;s and n n , as well as marketing costs exp to control for substitution e ects between underwriter prestige and other marketing activities, lnassets to control for Beatty and Welch's 1996 nding that larger rms use higher-quality underwriters, and the earnings per share for the last 12 months pre-otation as reported in the prospectus.
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The dependent variable is a dummy equalling one if the Carter-Manaster rank 7 Carter, Dark, and Singh's 1998 de nition of`prestigious' banks and zero otherwise. The reported coe cients are the marginal e ects of the independent variables on the probability of hiring a`prestigious' lead manager, and standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent.
The results clearly support the prediction that underwriter choice depends on rm characteristics. The marginal e ects estimated for n o;s and n n are positive and signi cant and indicate that for every ten percent increase in the participation ratio or dilution factor, the probability of hiring a`prestigious' lead manager increases by 3.3 and 0.8, respectively.
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Given the strongly negative marginal e ect estimated for exp,`prestigious' underwriters and other marketing activities appear to besubstitutes. The positive marginal e ect of lnassets con rms Beatty and Welch's earlier observation. Finally, there is a signi cantly negative association between pro tability and underwriter prestige, perhaps re ecting unwillingness amongst top banks to lead-manage highly speculative IPOs.
These ndings make it likely that the OLS coe cients indeed su er from bias. The nal three columns of Table 3 report consistent two-stage least squares estimates allowing for the simultaneity of underwriter choice. The rst stage estimates a least-squares version of our earlier probit regression, replacing the dummy dependent variable with rank itself.
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The results, reported in the fourth column, con rm the probit estimates. In the second stage, we use the predicted ranks from the rst-stage regression as instrumented variables in the underpricing fth column and wealth loss regressions nal column. This totally changes the relationship between rank and underpricing and wealth losses, compared to OLS: the coe cients estimated for rank are no longer signi cant and in fact become negative. This is more in line with the 1970s and 1980s evidence on the underpricing-reducing e ects of underwriter prestige. It strongly suggests that the 1990s evidence of the underpricing-increasing e ects of underwriter prestige is based on the false premise that underwriter choice is exogenous.
The coe cient o f rank in the wealth loss regression is insigni cant, just as we w ould expect:
changing to a higher-ranked underwriter should not reduce wealth losses at the margin if issuers behave optimally. In the underpricing regression, the coe cient o f rank is negative as predicted but not signi cant t = 1. Further investigation reveals this to be a problem of extraneous variables a ecting the e ciency of our estimate. If we drop either of the insigni cant risk proxies, the underwriting f e e and lnsales, or both, the still negative coe cient of rank becomes signi cant at 9, 4, and 0.3, respectively. In any case, the marketing costs exp a ect underpricing negatively in all the underpricing regressions of Table 3 , as predicted in Proposition 2.
Finally, we note that our ndings concerning the endogeneity of underwriter choice are robust to measuring underwriter`prestige' using market shares, as in Welch 1996 and Megginson and Weiss 1991, rather than`tombstone' ranks. 26 
Conclusions and implications
To recapitulate, we model underpricing as being endogenous, not in its own right, but to the wealth loss minimization problem encountered in a stock market otation. The bene ts of reducing underpricing depend on the issuer's participation in the o ering, via the secondary shares she sells, as well as the magnitude of the dilution she su ers on her retained shares, which increases in the number of newly issued shares. However, reducing underpricing is costly.
Therefore, it is not surprising that there is positive underpricing in equilibrium, as issuers trade o the costs and bene ts of lower underpricing. Using a large data set of U.S. IPOs, we nd support for the comparative statics predictions and structural restrictions of our model. We also nd support for the prediction that equilibrium wealth losses are unrelated to the level of marketing costs, which indicates that issuers indeed choose their marketing strategies optimally.
One key implication of our approach is that empirical work cannot and should not look at underpricing in isolation. Consider, for example, Muscarella and Vetsuypens' 1989 empirical refutation of Baron's 1982 underpricing model. Baron views underpricing as compensation to the investment bank for revealing its superior information about market demand and as payment for marketing e ort. Muscarella and Vetsuypens test this by looking at the underpricing experienced by a small sample of banks which underwrite their own otations, which they nd to be just as underpriced as IPOs in general. However, concluding from this that Baron's model does not hold is clearly premature: while the banks certainly internalize the information rent, there is still the issue of costly marketing e ort. Thus empirically, it is at least conceivable that Muscarella and Vetsuypens' banks sell far fewer primary or secondary shares than do issuers in general, thus leading to relatively lower incentives to expend marketing e ort in an attempt to minimize underpricing. In other words, we would argue that empirical tests should control for n o;s and n n , and compute wealth losses rather than underpricing returns. (N n + N o,s ) , where P 0 is the offer price and (N n + N o,s ) is the sum of primary (new) and secondary (old) shares offered. The participation ratio n o,s is N o,s /N o , that is the fraction of pre-flotation shares N o sold in the IPO. The dilution factor is n n = N n /N o . We excluded three firms from the data set for having dilution factors in excess of 10,000%; their inclusion would have strengthened our results. The underwriting fee is that component of the gross spread which represents compensation to the syndicate for providing underwriting cover. The Carter-Manaster (1990) ranks measure underwriter reputation on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 9 (highest). We use the updated ranks provided by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) . Partial adjustment equals the percentage adjustment between the midpoint of the indicative price range and the offer price. Underpricing is P 1 /P 0 -1, where P 1 is the closing share price on the first day of trading, extracted from the daily CRSP tapes. Panel C computes marketing costs and wealth losses. The wealth loss per old share is wl in equation (2) Variables are as defined in Table 1 . partadj is the adjustment between the midpoint of the indicative price range and the offer price. As proxies for ex ante uncertainty about firm value, , we use the underwriting fee, company age at flotation, log sales, and leverage. The i , i , i , and i refer to the regression parameters identified in section 2. Note that H 0 : 4 = 0 tests for optimality. Standard errors, given in italics under the coefficient estimates, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level or better, respectively, whilst † indicates significance at 10%. The Ftest tests the hypothesis that all parameter estimates are jointly zero. The Wald test of restrictions refers to the crossequation restrictions linking i , i , and i . 'Correlation of residuals' correlates the residuals of (exp1) and (UP1), and of (exp1) and (wl1). Equation-by-equation least squares is only consistent if these correlations are zero. The Hausman specification test tests for the exogeneity of offer size with respect to underpricing. All regressions include year dummies (coefficients not shown). Results are robust to outliers when estimating the four regressions across quartiles of n o,s and n n . The sample size is reduced to 1,357 due to missing information on company age. We investigate the effect of underwriter reputation on underpricing and wealth losses, under two alternative assumptions: that underwriter choice is exogenous (first two columns) and that it is endogenous to firm and offering characteristics (the remaining four columns). Underwriter reputation rank is measured using the lead-manager's CarterManaster ranking. The first two columns add rank to regressions (UP1) and (wl1) from Table 2 . The third column reports the results of a Probit where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if rank 7, and 0 otherwise. The fourth column repeats this using as dependent variable rank itself. To allow identification in the two-stage least squares regressions in the final three columns, we include in the rank regressions two new independent variables, ln(assets), the log of assets, and EPS -12 , the earnings per share in the twelve months before the IPO. The final two regressions reestimate (UP1) and (wl1) allowing rank to be endogenously chosen in the first-stage rank regression. Standard errors, given in italics under the coefficient estimates, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level or better, respectively, whilst † indicates significance at 10%. The F-test tests the hypothesis that all parameter estimates are jointly zero.
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